In May 2021, a meeting of the heads of three states took place in Kyiv, which marked the creation of the so-called “Associated Trio” consisting of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.[1] Two months later, in July of the same year, the parties signed the Batumi Declaration, which consolidated the intention and course of the three states towards European integration within the framework of the well-known European Union project – the Eastern Partnership.[2]

As early as June this year, the European Commission, represented by Ursula von der Leyen, recommended granting Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidates to become members of the EU, which was unanimously supported by all the leaders of the states and governments of the European Union at the summit in Brussels in June this year. Words of support were also expressed towards Georgia regarding its “European prospects”, however, in order to obtain the status of a candidate, Tbilisi was recommended to carry out a number of domestic reforms.[3]

While Georgia’s European prospects have only been redrawn, becoming an EU candidate also implies a decades-long accession journey, as evidenced by the history and experience of other candidates, including Albania, Turkey, North Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. And this was stressed by the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, after she expressed her support for granting candidate status for the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine saying that “After obtaining such status, a country can quickly move into the EU, but can move back in the absence of the necessary progress”.[4]

Returning to the concept of the Associated Trio, I would like to reflect on the future of Chisinau on the path to joining the European Union in this context.

On the one hand, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova came together in their aspirations for a foreign policy course focused on joining the EU, on the other hand, each of the countries goes its own way, as a candidate for membership, absolutely individually and to some extent in a distinctive way.

Moreover, Europe even supports this approach and regardless of the same criteria for all “desiring” candidates for obtaining the status of a candidate and joining the EU, it considers the process of European integration of the three states separately from each other.

If Georgia goes its own way, proceeding first of all from national interests, the precedent with Ukraine seems to be much more interesting.

During one of the last meetings of European leaders in Kyiv on June 16 of this year, French President Emmanuel Macron made it quite clear why Ukraine, given the current state of affairs, was able to achieve candidate status, saying the following: “Under all other circumstances, Ukraine could not have received candidate status for EU membership. We are doing this because there is fighting that is taking place in the country”.[5]

So far, the events in Ukraine are used by Europe in their personal interests, based on the geopolitical position of the state.

However, Kyiv’s attempts to put Chisinau on its own tracks of European integration can have disastrous and irreparable consequences both for the Associated Trio format, which can simply disintegrate, and for Moldova in particular, because what is good for one does not mean good for everyone. What does this mean?

Over the past six months, Kyiv has been taking active and very frank steps to involve Moldova in an armed confrontation with Russia, trying to persuade Chisinau to such agreements with Ukraine, which will simply put an end to the current status quo and the neutrality of the Republic.

First of all, Kyiv often reminds Chisinau that Moldova, as a state that has entered the path of joining the EU, must join the anti-Russian sanctions and thus provide Ukraine with proper support. At one time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, Nicolae Popescu, spoke very clearly on this score, emphasizing that Chisinau was not ready to join to Western anti-Russian sanctions due to the fact that the Moldovan economy largely depends on economic contacts with Moscow.[6]

Of great concern are also the constant calls of the Ukrainian authorities for the so-called restoring order in Transnistria. In one of his interviews to TV8 channel, Anton Gerashchenko, adviser to the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, called the region a “cancerous tumor” for Moldova and a big problem for Ukraine, since, according to him, “Transnistria exists entirely due to the support of the Kremlin”.[7] In continuation of the conversation A. Gerashchenko proposed to support Chisinau “in restoring the territorial integrity of the Republic”, which, taking into account the ongoing events, actually confirms Ukraine’s intention to contribute to the opening of a “second front” in this direction.

Moreover, the Armed Forces General Staff of Ukraine regularly disseminates information about the alleged military preparations in Transnistria and the development by the Russian Armed Forces General Staff  of plans for the “armed seizure of the Republic of Moldova”. In this regard, Kyiv, of course, is ready to provide “comprehensive support” for the neutralization of military infrastructure facilities of the Russian Forces Operational Group in Transnistria.

However, as the head of Transnistria Vadim Krasnoselsky rightly noted, such provocative statements, not supported by factual data and thrown by the Ukrainian side only just to solve their strategic tasks by destabilizing relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, negatively affect, first of all, 80 thousand citizens of Ukraine who permanently reside in the Republic of Moldova, and 27 thousand accepted Ukrainian refugees.

In addition, the desire of Kyiv to persuade Chisinau to agree to re-equip the Moldovan army with NATO weapons, as well as the possible signing of an agreement on military cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine and the sending of military instructors to the Republic to train Moldovan military personnel goes against with the principle of permanent military neutrality enshrined in the Constitution of Moldova.

The Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova spoke out in defense of maintaining the military neutrality of the Republic, calling on the country’s leadership to be careful in discussions with Western partners even the potential possibility of supplying foreign weapons to Moldova, since this undermines the constitutional status of the country’s permanent neutrality and aggravates the situation in the region.[8]

It is enough that today Kyiv and Chisinau have already reached an agreement on the use of the railway lines of Moldova, about which Sergey Bratchuk, the speaker of the Odessa Regional Military Administration (OVA), “let it slip” on his Telegram channel.[9] сIn his commentary on the statement of the Russian Defense department representative, Rustam Minnekayev, who named Russia’s goals in the second phase of the special military operation – the establishment of full control over the Donbass and southern Ukraine – S. Bratchuk wrote: “Why was this statement made right now? In order to scare the government of Moldova, through whose territory a large volume of military and humanitarian cargo goes to Ukraine.”

However, the concerns expressed by the socialists of the Republic of Moldova, even if they resonate among the population of Moldova, still they are considered by Western partners and Ukraine to be nothing but “hybrid aggression on the part of Russia”, in order to combat which it is necessary to “strengthen the vertical of power by removing from the Moldavian political scene pro-Russian forces”.[10]

Described Ukrainian rhetoric based on pulling in Chisinau into an armed conflict with Russia, and at the same time close military cooperation with NATO, is simply disastrous for maintaining neutrality, sovereignty and internal order in the Republic of Moldova.

As for Moldova’s accession to the European Union, in this context it would be wiser for Chisinau to also distance itself from Ukraine and the Kyiv scenario of European integration for quite compelling reasons.

First, no matter how merciful Europe may be, Ukraine does not correspond to the key criteria not only to candidates, but to potential EU members, including the judicial independence, respect for human rights and a developed market economy, which will require Europe to significantly simplify and abolish some of the criteria privately.

Moreover, today Ukraine is in the deepest economic crisis, and the economic recovery will require much more effort and investments than it was, for example, with the crisis situation in Greece in 2015, when the unity of Europe was called into question.

Such a gesture of goodwill will cost dearly, first of all, to the “Eurogrands” represented by Germany, France and other countries that are particularly affected by the consequences of anti-Russian sanctions.

At the domestic level, this will lead to an increase in protest moods, and at the external level, it will cause a negative reaction from the states that have been on the list of candidates for decades – the fact that is also stressed by Western experts.[11]

What is also important is that the political elite of Ukraine initially adopted a “Russophobic tone” as the basis for strengthening its positions, thereby diverting public attention from domestic problems and financial leaks.

Accession to the EU of another state with outright anti-Russian sentiments in addition to Poland will lead to complete chaos and disorganization in the work of the institutions of the European Union. Already today, European decision makers are reaping the benefits of such rhetoric and anti-Russian sanctions in the form of numerous street protests due to rising energy prices in Germany, France, Czech Republic.[12]

The anti-Russian tone of Ukraine as the EU member candidate, as well as Kyiv’s need for serious economic support, will cause irritation and waves of protests among the European citizens, who themselves are now suffering from an unprecedented energy crisis, and even on the eve of winter.

In addition to this, the decline in the economic well-being of the country inevitably leads to an increase in the marginal detachment of society. Ukraine’s accession to the EU will open doors to Europe for low-skilled Ukrainian migrants in the hope of obtaining a residence permit, citizenship, accommodation and, of course, not a job, but social insurance and support. Among such migrants there can be not only harmless dependents, but also Ukrainian criminals, as well as neo-Nazis, who for at least a decade have been developing and strengthening their positions without hindrance, while Kyiv authorities were busy with the issue of “bringing Ukraine to the European standards”.

The so-called moderate opposition is present in any state, but the influx of “activated” radicals will inevitably lead to the undermining of the European security architecture. A more detailed study on this subject was presented by Chinese colleagues from the Global Times.[13]

Thus, it becomes quite obvious that if Chisinau, as a member of the “Associated Trio” and a candidate for EU membership, nevertheless decides to be led by Kyiv, it will lose its military neutrality and will make it possible to make a springboard from the Republic for opening the “second front” by Ukraine, which will inevitably lead to the destabilization of the situation with the Transnistrian region, and will give NATO the green light to use the Republic as a North Atlantic satellite in the region (taking into account the fact that Europe has already made Moldova a hub for fighting with arms trafficking in Ukraine).[14]

Being involved in the so called European “trends” associated with Ukraine, Moldova thereby loses any chance of joining the European Union. As history and experience demonstrate, not a single state involved in an armed conflict has ever become a member of the EU, as extra trouble is simply not beneficial for Europe, which today is being rapidly depleted by internal political disagreements and street protests amid the anti-Russian rhetoric adopted by the EU itself.

Returning to the fate of the Associated Trio, I would like to repeat that each of the three states – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, are united around one goal in the form of European integration, but each of them has its own geopolitical, economic and socio-cultural characteristics. In the case of Moldova, the key for Chisinau is the need to maintain military neutrality, which will keep the state “attractive” as a candidate for EU membership. In this regard, it seems rational not to repeat other people’s mistakes, but to prevent them on their way, which will preserve the viability of the Associated Trio format and accelerate the process of European integration for Chisinau.